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ALIENATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
RICHARD

B. COLLINS'

A few weeks ago I was listening to my car radio during the Paul Harvey
talk show. I have an imperfect knowledge of radio talk shows because I listen
to them only in the car, and I don't drive much. But my general impression
had been that Mr. Harvey had mellowed in recent years and was not nearly as
ardent as the new wave of hard-righters, such as Rush Limbaugh. Harvey had
seemed related to Limbaugh the way that Barry Goldwater is to Phil Gramm.
On the subject of land trusts, I was wrong. Harvey delivered a jeremiad
against the Nature Conservancy worthy of anything one might hear from Rush.
The evil moguls of the Nature Conservancy, flush with cash, sneak up on
unsuspecting land owners and (horrors) buy their land on the open market!
Since then, Pat Buchanan has assumed the national mantle of anti-market
political guru. So maybe Mr. Harvey will be backing Pat for Commander-inChief. That used to be a military post, but in the New World Order, Pat would
switch the position to mercantilism. There is a cheery sort of nostalgia for
Japan as the enemy.
It is useful to have markets in mind as we evaluate conservation easements and land trusts. As Professor Cheever has shown, there are various
public interest arguments against enforcement of some conservation easements
after the passage of a generation or two.'
The danger in judicialized America is to avoid turning judges loose to do
whatever they wish according to their view of the public interest, or to make
conservation easements into one more version of litigation lotto. The hypothetical case of Deadlock Ranch is a fine example. We are told that Nora will
make over $14 million if her lawyers can break the land trust created by her
grandmother and paid for by tax deductions. This is another variation on $4
million for a repainted BMW. 2 We need to leave such inducements to Las
Vegas.
Historically, the courts have done a pretty good job of addressing obsolescent land restrictions. The problem they have tried to address is maintaining
the alienability of land-that is, freeing land markets from private efforts to

* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A., Yale University, 1960; L.L.B., Harvard
University School of Law, 1966.
1. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077
(1996).
2. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1995) (overturning jury award of $4 million for failing to disclose that a new BMW had been
repainted).
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gum them up and from the unintended effects of private arrangements made
long ago under very different conditions.
The proper solution, which courts have followed, is to make sure that
there are owners in the present generation who can bargain about whether
dead-hand restrictions should be maintained. Courts have used various devices
to achieve this, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities,3 the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation, 4 the doctrine of changed conditions for covenants,5 and the courts' power to interpret ambiguous conveyances and statutes
in favor of alienability.6 Some courts have gone further under the rubric of
relative hardship!
Even when there are persons in the present generation who can bargain
over land restrictions, transaction costs can block effective bargaining. When
subdivision covenants benefit many owners and no provision for majority rule
is in place, it is unlikely that one can obtain unanimous consent for modification or release. To meet this problem, courts have developed the doctrine of
changed conditions, and, in its proper use, the doctrine of relative hardship.!
A related problem occurs when future interests are retained by creators of
defeasible fee interests and come to be owned by many scattered heirs of the
original owners. Common law courts have failed to find a generally satisfactory solution to this problem. Various strategies, however, have overcome some
barriers. The situation is not common and is diminishing as defeasible fees are
less often created.9
Conservation easements present none of these problems because ownership cannot be divided. The easement is created in a unitary organization,
either a government or private corporation. The common law rule against
division of ownership of the benefit of an easement in gross ought to apply
(the "one-stock" rule),"0 so there should always be one owner in the present
generation who can bargain about modification or release of a restriction.
This is not to say that conservation easements cannot become obsolete.
But when they do, barriers to alienation do not arise from multiple ownership.
Rather, any barriers must derive from the terms of the easement itself or from
governing legislation.
Deadlock Ranch is an example. Laura did not like government and preferred a land trust because it was private. So the terms of the easement may

3.

See 3

THOMPSON ON

REAL

PROPERTY

ch. 28 (Thomas ed. 1994) [hereinafter THOMP-

SON].

4. See id. ch. 29.
5. See 7 id. § 62.15.
6. The previous rules were created by English judges. Ambiguities are construed against
other barriers to alienation, such as defeasible fee interests. See 2 id. § 20.07.
7. E.g., Lange v. Schofield, 567 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (Ala. 1990).
8. See 7 THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 62.15. The doctrine of changed conditions is recognized by § 3 of the Uniform Act and its comments, but the comments acknowledge that its application to interests called "easements" may be "problematic" under the law of some states. UNIF.
CONSERV. EASEMENT Acr § 3, 12 U.L.A. 68, 77 (Supp. 1995); see infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
9. See 2 THOMPSON, supra note 3, ch. 20.
10. See Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 200 A. 646, 651-52 (Pa. 1938).
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bar conveyance to a government. Other contractual barriers to alienation can
appear in the terms of a conservation easement. When these become serious
barriers to alienability, however, they should be subject to the common law
rule barring unreasonable restraints on alienation." This would free a moribund or broke land trust to convey either to government or to a robust land
trust.
Turn now to governing legislation. Common law easements may be reunited with the fee by voluntary, private action. What of statutory conservation
easements? May private land trusts reconvey to the fee owner? Is the rule
otherwise when an easement is owned by government?
Governing state legislation might prohibit a conveyance to the fee owner.
For example, the Colorado statute that would govern Deadlock Ranch provides: "A conservation easement in gross is an interest in real property freely
transferable in whole or in part for the purposes stated in [this article] and
transferable by any lawful method for the transfer of interests in real property
in this state."' 2 One can argue that this bans transfers to the fee owner because such would not be for the purposes stated in the statute. If so, this is
contrary to the common law. It is a permanent restraint on alienation of the
development rights in the land. And it can, over time, create a barrier to alienability of the burdened fee interest, when allowed uses become obsolete. However, the Colorado statute is not clear, and courts concerned with alienability
should read it otherwise. A land trust holding an obsolete restriction could sell
it to the fee owner and reinvest the proceeds in other easements or land, thus
serving the statutory purposes. Government-held easements could be sold yet
more freely.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act 3 is friendlier still to
alienability. Section 2(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a
conservation easement may be . . . assigned, released, modified, terminated, or
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements."'' 4 The
comments expressly recite:
The state's requirements concerning release of conventional easements apply as well to conservation easements because nothing in the
Act provides otherwise. On the other hand, if the state's existing law
does not permit easements in gross to be assigned, it will not be applicable to conservation easements because Section 4(2) effectively
authorizes their assignment.'"
If land trusts can reconvey to fee owners, one may argue that the trusts
will not behave like rational market actors, so the bilateral monopoly problem 6 is heightened, and intervention by judges is justified. I would not

11. See supra note 4.
12. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
13. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 173 (1996). The U.L.A. edition reported
that 16 states and the District of Columbia had adopted this act. Id.
14. Id. § 2(a) at 173.
15. Id. at 174. Section 4(2) provides, "A conservation easement is valid even though: ...(2)
it can be or has been assigned to another holder." Id. at 179.
16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 61-62, 253-54 (4th ed. 1992).
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accept this argument. If there are parties able to bargain over ending land
restrictions, that ought to end any need for judicial intervention. If the need is
great enough, legislatures will respond. Eminent domain is available. Any
greater judicial intervention will destabilize the conservation easement. Security of property rights in conservation easements is as much in the public interest as any other. If judges with Paul Harvey's mindset persuade themselves
that conservation easements are uniquely evil interests, they will be tempted to
undo them and try to confine the rule to conservation easements. But the genie
of remaking property won't be so easily confined. Judges with other attitudes
will apply "public interest" reasoning elsewhere. True, lawyers will be busy.
Too busy.

